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Abstract
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, each
year college freshmen move in and seniors move out of on-campus housing. Each student stays
on campus for only a few years. A student is a newcomer in the beginning and then becomes
an existing tenant. Motivated by this observation, we introduce a model of house allocation
with overlapping generations. In terms of a dynamic rule without monetary transfers, we
examine two static rules of serial dictatorship (SD) and top trading cycles (TTC), both of
which are based on an ordering of agents and give a higher-order agent a more advantageous
position in the assignment procedure. We support a seniority-based SD rule by showing its
dynamic Pareto eﬃciency. Similarly, we support a seniority-based TTC rule under time-
invariant preferences by showing its dynamic Pareto eﬃciency and incentive compatibility.
Keywords: house allocation, overlapping generations, seniority-based rules, serial dictatorship,
top trading cycles
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1 Introduction
The static allocation problem of assigning indivisible goods, called houses, to agents without
monetary transfers has been studied extensively and applied to real-life markets such as on-campus
housing for college students (Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez, 1999; Chen and Sönmez, 2002; Guillen
and Kesten, 2010), kidney exchanges for patients (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver, 2004, 2005), and
school choice for U.S. public schools (Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez, 2003). Until now, there have
been few attempts to analyze dynamic house allocation problems.1
Considering the dynamic aspects of the issue enables us to study features of the allocation
problem that cannot be captured by static models. For example, in the case of on-campus housing
for college students, each year freshmen move in and graduating seniors leave. Each student stays
on campus for only a few years. A student is a newcomer in the beginning and then becomes
an existing tenant.2 In general, students are overlapping. In this structure, it is not always
dynamically Pareto eﬃcient to have a static Pareto-eﬃcient matching in each period.
To illustrate this point, suppose that in the ﬁrst period t = 1, there is one agent a0, called an
initial existing tenant, who has come before the market starts and lives there only in this period.
Moreover, in each period t ≥ 1, one agent at arrives to live in a house in periods t and t+1. In each
period t, there is an existing tenant at−1, who has come in the previous period, and a newcomer
at. There are two durable houses h1 and h2. Each agent prefers h1 to h2, and (h2, h1) to (h1, h2).3
Consider the following plan:
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 · · ·
a0 h2
a1 h1 h2
a2 h1 h2
a3 h1 h2
...
...
...
In each period, an existing tenant is assigned h2 and a newcomer is assigned h1. This plan is
Pareto eﬃcient for each period's static market. However, consider an inﬁnite exchange between an
1See recent exceptions: Abdulkadiro§lu and Loertscher (2007), Bloch and Cantala (2008), Kamijo and Kawasaki
(2010), and Ünver (2010).
2In the literature of house allocation with existing tenants (Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez, 1999), existing tenants
have the property rights on houses and newcomers do not. Contrary to this usage, in this paper, given any period of
time, existing tenants are the agents who have come to the market in a previous period, while newcomers are those
who have just arrived. Property rights can be endogenous in a dynamic rule. We introduce and study a dynamic
rule with speciﬁc property rights transfer, i.e., a spot rule with property rights transfer, in which in any peirod of
time, existing tenants have the property rights on a previously lived-in house and newcomers do not.
3For example, (h2, h1) is a consumption path where an agent consumes house h2 in the ﬁrst period, and h1 in
the next. Note that this preference violates the discounted utility model. However, considering a critique of the
discounted utility model as reviewed by Frederick, Lowenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002), we allow for any preference
relation on {h1, h2} × {h1, h2} in this paper. See footnote 16 for further discussion.
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existing tenant and a newcomer in each period, where an existing tenant exchanges her house h2
for the newcomer's house h1. As a result, the initial existing tenant is assigned h1, and each of
the other agents is assigned (h2, h1). Every agent prefers this new plan to the original. Thus, the
original plan is not dynamically Pareto eﬃcient.
Many universities in the United States use a variant of the so-called random serial dictatorship
rule to allocate dormitory rooms.4 This rule randomly orders the agents and then applies the serial
dictatorship (SD) rule: the ﬁrst agent is assigned her top choice, and the next agent is assigned
her top choice among the remaining rooms, and so on. This ordering is not entirely random, but
rather depends on seniority. That is, existing tenants are favored over newcomers.
In the previous example, consider period orderings that order a newcomer at as the ﬁrst and an
existing tenant at−1 as the second in each period. Applying an SD rule in each period, we obtain
the same plan as indicated in the previous table. As we saw, this plan is not dynamically Pareto
eﬃcient. By contrast, consider other period orderings that order an existing tenant ﬁrst, and a
newcomer next. The plan by the SD rule with these orderings Pareto dominates the original and is
dynamically Pareto eﬃcient. That is, when we apply the SD rule each period, the orderings based
on seniority perform well in terms of dynamic Pareto eﬃciency.
The subject of this paper is to present a new dynamic framework for the house allocation problem
by considering an overlapping generations structure,5 and to analyze the impact of orderings on
dynamic Pareto eﬀciency and the incentive compatibility of rules. To our knowledge, we are the
ﬁrst to oﬀer the rationale for seniority-based rules in terms of the positive properties.6
Our model extends the standard overlapping generations (OLG) model7 to the house allocation
problem. Time is discrete and lasts forever. There are ﬁnitely many durable houses8 that are
collectively owned, but only initial existing tenants may have the right to live in a house in the ﬁrst
period. In each period, ﬁnitely many agents arrive to stay for two periods, while the oldest agents
leave the market. Each agent consumes one house in each period. Each agent has a time-separable
preference over consumption paths, consisting of period preferences. Her preference does not evolve
over time: during her stay, she has the the same preference as she had upon arrival. However, we
do allow period preferences to vary across periods. A real-life example that ﬁts this model is
that of dormitory room-assignment for on-campus housing and room assignment for apartment
management companies.
4We will mention some of real-life examples later in this section.
5Block and Cantala (2008) independently consider a similar model to ours. See the Section on Related literature
for the diﬀerence.
6There are almost no papers on the importance of seniority-based rules, but an exception is Sönmez and Ünver
(2005). They show in a house allocation problem with existing tenants that the core rule from random endowments
of vacant houses to newcomers, which is a natural appealing approach based on Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez (1998),
is extremely biased in the sense that it is equivalent to a stochastic AS-TTC rule favoring newcomers.
7See Samuelson (1958), or Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).
8In the standard OLG model, a consumption good is not durable but perishable. Another equivalent assumption
of durability of houses in our OLG model is that houses are perishable but the same supply of houses falls from
heaven every period, as pointed out by a referee. But we do not take this interpretation, because our main
applications are dormitory rooms and apartments as indivisible objects that are considered to be durable.
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We focus on a particular dynamic rule, called a spot rule: each agent reveals her period pref-
erences instead of the full preference. Based on the reported period-preference proﬁle, a spot rule
chooses a plan. Depending on whether property rights are transferable, we analyze the two types
of spot rules: In a spot rule with property rights transfer, the houses occupied by the oldest agent
become vacant in the next period, but those occupied by the other agents become their properties
that they can trade or continue to occupy. On the other hand, a spot rule without property rights
transfer has no transfer of property rights.
At any point in time, our spot rule without property rights transfer resembles a house allocation
problem (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979) where no agent has property rights on any house. The
representative rule in theory and practice is a (static) random serial dictatorship (RSD) (Abdulka-
diro§lu and Sönmez, 1998). Some colleges, such as Davidson College, Lafayette College, and St.
Olaf College, use a seniority-based RSD spot rule with the requirement that all students participate
every year. A serial dictatorship (SD) spot rule is a spot rule without property rights transfer in
which an SD static rule is applied in each period, given period orderings. As we saw in the previous
example, period orderings that favor newcomers do not always induce a dynamically Pareto-eﬃcient
plan (Theorem 2). On the other hand, a speciﬁc period ordering that favors existing tenants does
induce a dynamically Pareto-eﬃcient plan (Theorem 3).
We also introduce a notion of acceptability: an acceptable spot rule always induces a plan
under which each existing tenant ﬁnds her current house at least as desirable as her previous one.9
The importance of acceptability comes from observations of on-campus housing and apartment
assignments.
In on-campus housing, the RSD rule is rarely used, although it is simple, Pareto eﬃcient, and
strategy-proof (Svensson, 1994). Rather, many universities use its modiﬁed rule, called an RSD
rule with squatting rights, where existing tenants either keep their current rooms or give up them
and participate in the RSD rule. This seniority-based rule is used at Northwestern University,
the University of Michigan, and the University of Pittsburgh, among others. Students in these
universities can choose to stay oﬀ campus. Even colleges that require all students to live on
campus use this seniority-based rule, for example, Gordon College, Guilford College, and Lawrence
University. This rule is acceptable for existing tenants who keep their current rooms, but not
acceptable for those entering the RSD rule who might end up with a worse house; i.e., it is not
(ex-post) individually rational. The main reason for its use10 is that universities want to keep
9The acceptability reminds us of the Ratchet eﬀect−the tendency of performance standards in an incentive system
to be adjusted upward after a particularly good performance (for example, see Milgrom and Roberts (1992)). I thank
William Thomson for pointing this out.
10James Earle, Assistant Vice Chancellor for Business at the University of Pittsburgh, gave me the following
oﬃcial reason: The goal of the Department of Housing is, ﬁrst and foremost, customer satisfaction. By allowing
students the opportunity to retain a room they like, we are guaranteeing the satisfaction of these returning customers.
Furthermore, if these students were forced out of their room, they could not only become a dissatisﬁed customer,
if they then get a room they don't like, but they could also decide to live oﬀ campus and become someone else's
customer. Why risk the loss of revenue, when you have the potential to have a satisﬁed customer simply by allowing
them to retain their room?
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students on campus, which makes the universities ﬁnancially less risky. Thus, an acceptable rule
is desirable to both students and universities.
Turning to apartment assignment, companies face a legal contract where a tenant is protected
from eviction during the lease so long as the tenant does not violate any substantial provision or
any local housing laws or code.11 Thus, apartment assignment must also be acceptable.
The above two observations also motivate us to examine a spot rule with property rights transfer.
At any point in time, this spot rule resembles a static house allocation problem with existing tenants
(Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez, 1999) in which there are newcomers (agents without property rights)
and existing tenants (agents with property rights). In a static context, Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez
(1999) show that the RSD rule with squatting rights is neither (ex-post) individually rational nor
statically Pareto eﬃcient. For this reason, they propose a rule based on the Gale's top trading
cycles (TTC) rule (Shapley and Scarf, 1974), referred to as AS-TTC rule.12 This rule restores
static Pareto eﬃciency that the RSD rule with squatting rights lacks, while satisfying individual
rationality and strategy-proofness.
Any SD spot rule is not acceptable, since all houses that an existing tenant ﬁnds at least as
desirable as her previously owned one can be obtained by higher-order agents. On the other hand,
acceptability is always achieved when in each period an existing tenant is assigned the property
rights of her previously owned house and is then assigned a house induced by an individually
rational static rule. Thus, we consider the spot rule with property rights transfer where we apply
an individually rational AS-TTC rule in each period. This rule is called a TTC spot rule.
However, we get the impossibility result (Theorem 1) in which no spot rule is dynamically Pareto
eﬃcient and acceptable. Therefore, any TTC spot rule is not dynamically Pareto eﬃcient although
it induces a statically Pareto-eﬃcient matching in each period. By restricting the problem to the
time-invariant preference domain, where the preference of each agent consists of identical period
preferences, we avoid the impossibility result and show that a speciﬁc seniority-based TTC spot
rule is both dynamically Pareto eﬃcient and acceptable, as well as incentive compatible (Theorems
5 and 7). But a non-seniority based rule, i.e., a TTC spot rule favoring newcomers, is neither
dynamically Pareto eﬃcient nor incentive compatible (Theorems 6 and 8).
We emphasize that in the time-invariant preference domain, a TTC spot rule is not just a
repetition of an AS-TTC static rule but has distinct features:13 We have entry and exit of agents
with diﬀerent preferences in each period. Also, property rights are endogenous.
11For example, see http://www.housingnyc.com/index.html for the rent guidelines by New York City Rent Guide-
lines Board.
12AS-TTC rule works as follows: Given the ordering of agents, assign agents their favorite houses one-at-a-time
following their ordering and whenever an agent demands the house of an existing tenant, modify the ordering by
inserting the existing tenant at the top. Whenever a loop of existing tenants forms, assign each of them the house
she demands and proceed.
13Although the consistency concept in a static model takes care of the variable population, it does not allow
endogenous property rights. For the consistency concept, see Sönmez and Ünver (2010) for a house allocation
problem with existing tenants, Ergin (2000) for a house allocation problem, and Thomson (2008) for the various
resource allocation problems.
4
Our main theoretical contributions are to show, when one applies an SD or AS-TTC rule that is
statically Pareto-eﬃcient and strategy-proof in each period, how and whether such static properties
carry over to dynamic Pareto eﬃciency and incentive compatibility in a dynamic matching model.
We show that this question depends on whether the static rules are seniority based or not. To this
end, after describing the model in Section 2, we examine a general spot rule in Section 3. Then,
we contrast seniority-based rules with the non-seniority-based ones of SD rules and TTC rules in
Sections 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6, we discuss the case where agents live for at least three
periods. Finally, in the last section we discuss our results.
1.1 Related literature
There is an extensive literature on static house allocation problems. Pápai (2000a) introduces hier-
archical exchange rules, which are similar to but wider than the AS-TTC rules by Abdulkadiro§lu
and Sönmez (1999) in that Pápai's rules accommodate a more general than theirs and uses the
idea of Gale's TTC algorithm. Her rules characterize a class of Pareto-eﬃcient, reallocation-proof,
and group strategy-proof rules. Recently, Pycia and Ünver (2010) proposed a wider class of rules,
called trading cycles rules, which characterize a class of Pareto-eﬃcient and group strategy-proof
rules. See Sönmez and Ünver (2011) for a recent survey.
A dynamic house allocation problem can be classiﬁed depending on how and when agents arrive
and exit. With the deterministic arrival and exit of agents like ours, Bloch and Cantala (2008)
independently consider a model similar to ours. Instead of rules as a function of preferences, they
focus on a Markovian assignment rule as a function of the past assignment.
An important application of house allocation problems is kidney exchange for patients (Roth,
Sönmez, and Ünver, 2004, 2005). Ünver (2010) studies a dynamic kidney exchange problem where
agents arrive stochastically. We cannot apply our model to kidney exchange for two reasons. First,
a patient with live donors (i.e. an agent with property rights) arrives in each period, whereas in our
model only the initial existing tenants may have endowments. Second, kidney patients immediately
leave the market once their exchange is done, but our model does not allow for this.
Let us turn to the model without the arrival and exit of agents. Abdulkadiro§lu and Loertscher
(2007) study a dynamic house allocation problem with two periods where each agent's type is drawn
in each period. Kamijo and Kawasaki (2010) study stability and competitive equilibrium in the
dynamic housing market with time-invariant preferences. This type of model can be analyzed by
static models: in multiple-type housing markets (Konishi, Quint, and Wako, 2001; Wako, 2005;
Klaus, 2008), the number of types is interpreted as the life span of agents; in multiple assignment
problems (Pápai, 2000b, 2001; Klaus and Miyagawa, 2001; Ehlers and Klaus, 2003), the quota
of houses is identical across houses and then interpreted as the life span of agents. Adding the
feasibility constraint of matching where a house is consumed by at most one agent in each period,
we can see this as a dynamic model with time-invariant preferences.
Finally, there is a growing literature on dynamic rules with monetary transfers. For example,
see Athey and Segal (2007) and Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009).
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Table 1: Demographic structure and a plan: The left table shows when an agent is present. For
example, agent ati is present in periods t and t + 1. The right table shows a plan {µ(t)}∞t=1 where
there are two houses h1 and h2, and only one agent arrives in each period.
1 2 · · · t t+ 1 · · ·
a0i −
a1i − −
...
. . .
at−1i −
ati − −
at+1i − · · ·
...
. . .
1 2 · · · t t+ 1 · · ·
µ(1) µ(2) · · · µ(t) µ(t+ 1) · · ·
a0 h1
a1 h2 h1
...
. . .
at−1 h1
at h2 h2
at+1 h1 · · ·
...
. . .
2 The Model
Time is discrete, starts at t = 1, and lasts forever. There is a ﬁnite set, H, of indivisible goods,
called houses, which are collectively owned. Houses are inﬁnitely durable.
In each period t, n agents, where n ∈ N++, arrive to consume houses for two periods, and then
leave. In period 1, there are n initial existing tenants who live only in period 1. We imagine
that initial existing tenants have arrived in period 0 before the model starts. An agent is denoted
by ati (t ≥ 0 and i = 1, · · · , n) where the superscript indicates her arrival period and the subscript
indexes her in her cohort (Table 1). Let N(t) := {at1, · · · , atn}. In each period, the agents who
have just arrived are called newcomers, while those who have arrived in the previous period are
called existing tenants. In other words, in period t, newcomers are agents in N(t), and existing
tenants are agents in N(t − 1). Let E(t) := N(t − 1) be the set of all existing tenants in period
t. In particular, E(1) is the set of all initial existing tenants. Unlike the model of Abdulkadiro§lu
and Sönmez (1999), here existing tenants do not necessary have property rights for a house. Let
A(t) := N(t) ∪ E(t) be the set of all agents present in period t. Thus, for each period t ≥ 1,
|A(t)| = 2n. Let A := ∪∞t=1A(t) ≡ E(1)∪ (∪∞t=1N(t)) be the set of all agents. Note that there is an
inﬁnite number of periods and also an inﬁnite number of agents in this model. It is this double
inﬁnity that diﬀerentiates ours from the static models, which always assume a ﬁnite number of
agents and houses.14
In each period, each agent consumes one house. The number of houses is equal to that of agents
present in each period, that is, |H| = |A(t)| = 2n. We ﬁx H and A throughout the paper.
Each initial existing tenant, a0, has a strict preference relation,15 Ra0 , on H. On the other
hand, consider an agent, a, who is a newcomer in period t ≥ 1. Her consumption set is H × H.
14The double inﬁnity is the major source of the theoretical peculiarities of the standard OLG model (Shell, 1971).
15A preference relation is a complete, reﬂexive, and transitive binary relation. A strict preference relation is a
preference relation where no two distinct alternatives are indiﬀerent.
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(ht, ht+1) ∈ H × H indicates that ht and ht+1 are the consumed houses when she is a newcomer
and an existing tenant, respectively. She has a (weak) preference relation Ra on H ×H, which is
not always strict. Let Pa be the asymmetric part of Ra. Given x, x′ ∈ H ×H, x Ra x′ means that
agent a ﬁnds x at least as desirable as x′, and x Pa x′ means that she prefers x to x′. Moreover, the
preference relation Ra is time separable,16 that is, there are strict preferences Ra(t) and Ra(t+1)
on H such that for each ht, ht+1, h′t, h
′
t+1 ∈ H,
1. if ht Ra(t) h′t and ht+1 Ra(t+ 1) h
′
t+1, then (ht, ht+1) Ra (h
′
t, h
′
t+1),
2. if ht Ra(t) h′t and ht+1 Ra(t+ 1) h
′
t+1 such that at least one of them holds with Pa(t) or
Pa(t+ 1), then (ht, ht+1) Pa (h′t, h
′
t+1).
We call Ra(t) a period t preference. A preference Ra is time invariant if all of its period
preferences are identical, i.e., Ra(t) = Ra(t + 1). Note that if we know the preference relation Ra
of agent a in N(t), we obtain a collection (Ra(t), Ra(t+ 1)) of her period preferences, but not vice
versa.
In some cases, a time-invariant preference is derived from a cardinal utility function on H as the
sum of utilities across periods: for some utility function ua : H → R, a preference Ra is represented
by the utility function Ua(ht, ht+1) := ua(ht) + ua(ht+1) . In other words, the preference depends
on how many periods an agent consumes each house.
Let Ra be the set of all preference relations of agent a, and Ra(t) be the set of all period-
preference relations of agent a where for each initial existing tenant a, we take Ra(1) = Ra. Let
R := ∏a∈ARa, R(t) := ∏a∈A(t)Ra(t), R−a := ∏b∈A\{a}Rb, and R−a(t) := ∏b∈A\{a}Rb(t). The
generic elements are denoted by R, R(t) and R−a, and R−a(t), respectively.
We call a collection of all time-separable preference proﬁles the general preference domain.
On the other hand, the time-invariant preference domain is the collection of all preference
proﬁles where each agent has a time-invariant preference relation. This domain is appropriate
when the period is so short that all agents perceive their period preferences to be unchanging over
time.
A period t matching, µ(t), is a bijection from A(t) to H such that house µa(t) is the one
assigned to agent a. Let M(t) be the set of all period t matchings. See Table 1 for an example.
A plan, µ := {µ(t)}∞t=1, is a collection of period t matchings. Let M be the set of all plans. µa
indicates the houses assigned to agent a ∈ A under plan µ ∈ M: If a ∈ E(1), µa = µa(1), and if
a ∈ N(t) with t ≥ 1, µa = (µa(t), µa(t+ 1)).
Given a preference relation Ra of agent a, initially deﬁned over the product of houses, we extend
it to the set of plans in the following natural way: agent a prefers plan µ to plan ν if and only if
16As we discussed in the Introduction, our assumption of time-separable preference violates the discounted utility
(DU) model in two ways: Even if her preference is time invariant, an agent may prefer an improving path of houses
over declining paths, which violates the DU model. If not, a period preference in some period may be aﬀected by
houses experienced in prior or future periods, which violates the independence assumption of the DU model. We
do not go into details of experimental results on the validity of these assumptions. See Frederick, Lowenstein, and
O'Donoghue (2002), especially sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5, for further discussions.
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she prefers µa to νa. Similarly, we extend a period preference to the set of period matchings.
An endowment proﬁle indicates on which house each initial existing tenant has a property
right only in period 1. Formally, it is a period 1 matching restricted to the set of initial existing
tenants, e(1)|E(1). Each agent except the initial existing tenants has no property right on any house
when she arrives. We consider two kinds of house allocation problems with overlapping
generations, or simply, dynamic problems, depending on the assumption of endowments: In
a dynamic problem without endowments (A,H,R), no initial existing tenants have property
rights, while in a dynamic problem with endowments (A,H,R, e(1)|E(1)), all initial existing
tenants have property rights.
3 Spot Rules
3.1 Deﬁnitions
In a dynamic rule, each agent is asked to send a message, and then a plan is determined based on
the message proﬁle sent by all agents. Formally, a dynamic rule is a function from
∏
a∈A Sa toM
where Sa is the message space of agent a ∈ A. A dynamic rule is direct if for each a ∈ A, Sa = Ra.
A spot rule is a dynamic rule such that if a is an initial existing tenant, Sa = Ra ≡ Ra(1), and if
a is a newcomer in period t ≥ 1, Sa = Ra(t)×Ra(t+ 1). Note that any spot rule is not direct. We
consider two kinds of spot rules: In a spot rule with property rights transfer, in each period,
the houses consumed by newcomers become their properties that they can trade or continue to
consume in the next period, while those consumed by existing tenants become vacant in the next
period. A spot rule without property rights transfer has no transfer of property rights. A
period t (static and direct) rule is a function from R(t) toM(t). Note that a spot rule can be
constructed from all period rules.
A plan µ dynamically Pareto dominates a plan ν at R ∈ R if for each a ∈ A, µa Ra νa,
and for some a ∈ A, µa Pa νa. A plan is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient at R ∈ R if it is not
dynamically Pareto dominated by any other plan at R, i.e., there is no other plan that all agents
ﬁnd at least as desirable and at least one agent prefers. Denote by PD the mapping that associates
with each R ∈ R the set of all dynamically Pareto-eﬃcient plans at R. A period t matching µ(t) is
statically Pareto eﬃcient at R(t) ∈ R(t) if there is no ν(t) ∈M(t) such that for each a ∈ A(t),
νa(t) Ra(t) µa(t), and for some a ∈ A(t), νa(t) Pa(t) µa(t).17 Denote by P tS the mapping that
associates with each R(t) ∈ R(t) the set of all statically Pareto-eﬃcient period t matchings at R(t).
We introduce the notion of acceptability:
Deﬁnition 1. In a dynamic problem without endowments, a plan µ is acceptable at R ∈ R
if for each existing tenant a in period t ≥ 2, µa(t) Ra(t) µa(t − 1). For a dynamic problem with
endowments, it is acceptable at R ∈ R if the above condition holds, and for each initial existing
17The example in the Introduction shows that a plan consisting of statically Pareto-eﬃcient period-matchings is
not dynamically Pareto eﬃcient.
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tenant a ∈ E(1), µa(1) Ra(1) ea(1). Denote by A the mapping that associates with each R ∈ R
the set of all acceptable plans at R.
As discussed in the Introduction, an acceptable plan is desirable to students and universities in
on-campus housing, and is necessary for apartment assignments because of the rental contracts.
A direct dynamic rule Γ is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient if for each R ∈ R, Γ(R) ∈ PD(R).
Moreover, it is acceptable if for each R ∈ R, Γ(R) ∈ A(R). A period t rule pi is statically
Pareto eﬃcient if for each R(t) ∈ R(t), pi(R(t)) ∈ P tS(R(t)).
To deﬁne properties for a spot rule, we introduce some notation: For each a ∈ A and each
Ra ∈ Ra, denote by pa(Ra) a function that transforms her preference Ra to her constituent period
preferences. That is, if a ∈ E(1), pa(Ra) = Ra, and if a ∈ N(t) with t ≥ 1, pa(Ra) = (Ra(t), Ra(t+
1)). Let p(R) :=
∏
a∈A pa(Ra) and p−a(R−a) =
∏
b∈A\{a} pb(Rb).
A spot rule Π is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient if for each R ∈ R, Π[p(R)] ∈ PD(R). Moreover,
it is acceptable if for each R ∈ R, Π[p(R)] ∈ A(R).
Proposition 1. If a spot rule is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient (acceptable), then there is a direct
dynamic rule that is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient (acceptable).
Proof. For a spot rule Π, consider the direct dynamic rule Γ: for each R ∈ R, Γ(R) := Π(p(R)).
Let us now turn to incentive compatibility of rules. The deﬁnition of strategy-proofness
in a direct (dynamic or period) rule requires truth-telling to be a dominant strategy for each
agent, or equivalently, a proﬁle of true preferences to be a Nash equilibrium in its associated
preference revelation game. On the other hand, since a spot rule is not direct, we cannot use it
for a spot rule. In a spot rule, an agent faces an extensive form with simultaneous moves. A
strategy for an agent is her contingency plan. Note that truth-telling of her period preferences is a
history-independent strategy that speciﬁes only one period preference in each period. Our notion
of incentive compatibility is as follows.18
Deﬁnition 2. A spot rule Π is incentive compatible if a proﬁle of true period preferences is a
Nash equilibrium in its associated period-preference revelation game, i.e., for each R ∈ R and each
a ∈ A,
• if a is an initial existing tenant, then for each Rˆa(1) ∈ Ra(1), Π[p(R)] Ra Π[Rˆa(1), p−a(R−a)],
• if a is a newcomer in period t ≥ 1, then for each Rˆa(t) ∈ Ra(t) and each Rˆa(t+1) ∈ Ra(t+1),
Π[p(R)] Ra Π[(Rˆa(t), Rˆa(t+ 1)), p−a(R−a)].
18If our incentive compatibility required truthful revelation of period preferences to be a dominant strategy for
each agent, our main positive results of Proposition 3 and Theorem 5 would not hold. But if a spot rule is incen-
tive compatible as in Deﬁnition 2, then the truthful revelation is a dominant strategy among history-independent
strategies for each agent, but not vice versa (this is because an agent can beneﬁt from a strategy depending on
history-dependent strategies of the others).
In our speciﬁc rules of SD and TTC, which are introduced in Sections 4 and 5, if a proﬁle of true period preferences
is a Nash equilibrium, it is also a subgame perfect equilibrium. This is shown in footnotes 21 and 24.
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Our incentive compatibility of a spot rule is linked with strategy-proofness of a direct dynamic
rule as follows:
Proposition 2 (Revelation principle). If a spot rule is incentive compatible, then there is a
direct dynamic rule that is strategy-proof.
Proof. Given a spot rule Π, deﬁne the direct dynamic rule Γ: for each R ∈ R, Γ(R) := Π(p(R)).
Let R ∈ R, a ∈ A, and R′a ∈ Ra. Since a spot rule Π is incentive compatible, Π[p(R)] Ra
Π[pa(R
′
a), p−a(R−a)]. Thus, Γ(R) Ra Γ(R
′
a, R−a).
In spite of the revelation principle, because the spot rule captures the situation where a static
rule is applied in each period as in real-life markets, we focus on the spot rule.
3.2 Impossibility result
We might want to search for a dynamically Pareto-eﬃcient and acceptable spot rule. The following
result rules out such a rule. The proof is in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. 19 Consider the general preference domain in a dynamic problem with or without en-
dowments. Suppose that at least two agents arrive in each period. Then no spot rule is dynamically
Pareto eﬃcient and acceptable.
In checking dynamic Pareto eﬃciency, we have to look at two types of exchanges that do not
exist in a static model: inﬁnite exchanges between agents from diﬀerent cohorts as in the example
of the Introduction, and ﬁnite exchanges across periods among agents in the same cohort. The
former is speciﬁc to the OLG structure. The latter, which we focus on in our proof, is for any kind
of dynamic model.
In the proof, we assume that there is a spot rule satisfying dynamic Pareto eﬃciency and
acceptability. We ﬁrst specify a preference proﬁle. Using the two properties, we narrow down a
possible plan as a candidate of the plan induced by the spot rule in the following way. We pick
two agents from the same cohort whose period preferences are reversed across two periods (thus,
their preferences are not time invariant). Then, acceptability constrains the possible plan. For
example, if an agent a is assigned a house h that is the worst house in her period preference Ra(t)
and the next period preference Ra(t+ 1) ranks h as her top choice, then by acceptability she must
be assigned h in the next period. Finally, we use the property of spot rules: when two preference
proﬁles are distinct but have the same period-preference proﬁle, by deﬁnition, a spot rule induces
the same plan. Thus, we ﬁnd another preference proﬁle with the same period-preference proﬁle
where a candidate plan might be dynamically Pareto eﬃcient in one preference proﬁle, but not so
in another proﬁle. This contradicts the dynamic Pareto eﬃciency of the spot rule.
19If there are at least two agents who live for at least three periods, then we have the impossibility result for a
direct dynamic rule: no direct dynamic rule is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient and acceptable. See Kurino (2009) for
the detail.
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Restricting our attention to the time-invariant preference domain, we show that we avoid the
impossibility result for a dynamic problem both with and without endowments (Remarks 1 and 2).
4 Serial Dictatorship (SD) Spot Rules
We consider a speciﬁc spot rule without property rights transfer, called a serial dictatorship (SD)
spot rule, whose underlying period rule is a serial dictatorship (SD) rule. For simplicity, we always
consider the rule for a dynamic problem without endowments, so that no agent has property rights
in any period.
4.1 Period and cohort orderings of agents
All spot rules that we examine are based on some ordering of agents. Given a set B ⊆ A of agents,
an ordering in B is a linear ordering,20 denoted by fB. We denote it as the ordered list:
fB := (b1, b2, · · · , bm) if and only if b1 fB b2 fB · · · fB bm.
We say that b1 is the ﬁrst agent in B, b2 is the second agent in B, and so on. In addition,
agent a has a higher order than agent b if a fB b.
We look at two speciﬁc orderings: A period t ordering is an ordering in A(t) that is the set
of all agents present in period t. A cohort ordering is an ordering of agents in the same cohort,
i.e., an ordering in E(1) or N(t) for t ≥ 1.
To investigate what kind of period orderings have an eﬀect on various properties of spot rules,
we elaborate on the period orderings:
Deﬁnition 3. 1. A period t ordering fA(t) favors existing tenants if each existing tenant
has a higher order than any newcomer in fA(t). It favors newcomers if each newcomer has
a higher order than any existing tenant in fA(t).
2. A sequence of period orderings favors existing tenants (newcomers) if in each period
t, the period t ordering favors existing tenants (newcomers).
3. A sequence of period orderings is constant if the relative ranking of agents is the same across
periods. That is, if an agent a has a higher order than another agent a′ in some period, then
a has a higher order than a′ in any other period when they are both present.
In later sections, we investigate spot rules when the underlying sequence of period orderings is
constant and favors existing tenants. In this case, we can create the ordering of all agents by which
we can reproduce the period orderings:
20A linear ordering is a complete, reﬂexive, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation.
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Observation 1. Given a constant sequence {fA(t)}∞t=1 of period ordering favoring existing tenants,
we can construct an ordering in the set A of all agents, denoted by F , which consists of cohort
orderings (fE(1), {fN(t)}∞t=1) such that F := (fE(1), fN(1), fN(2), · · · ), fA(1) = (fE(1), fN(1)) ≡ F |A(1),
and for each t ≥ 2, fA(t) = (fN(t−1), fN(t)) = F |A(t).
This observation is the key to prove our main positive results.
4.2 Deﬁnition: SD spot rules
In period t ≥ 1, agents in A(t) are present, houses in H are available, each agent a ∈ A(t) has a
strict period preference Ra(t) on H, and no agent has property rights on any house. That is, it is
a house allocation problem (A(t), H,R(t)) (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979).
Let R(t) ∈ R(t), and fA(t) be a period t ordering. A serial dictatorship (SD) period t rule
induced by fA(t) is determined as follows.
Step 1: The ﬁrst agent in fA(t) is assigned her top choice according to Ra(t).
...
Step k: The kth agent in fA(t) is assigned her top choice among the remaining houses according
to Ra(t).
It is known that an SD static rule is strategy-proof and statically Pareto eﬃcient (Svensson,
1994).
Now, we are ready to deﬁne an SD spot rule: A serial dictatorship (SD) spot rule induced
by a sequence of period orderings, {fA(t)}∞t=1, is a spot rule without property rights transfer
where for each period t, the period t rule is the SD period t rule induced by fA(t). Moreover, an
SD spot rule favoring existing tenants (newcomers) is an SD spot rule induced by some
sequence of period orderings favoring existing tenants (newcomers). Also, a constant SD spot
rule is an SD spot rule induced by some constant sequence of period orderings. When we say an
SD spot rule, we mean an SD spot rule induced by some sequence of period orderings.
An SD spot rule consists of statically Pareto-eﬃcient and strategy-proof SD period rules. The
question is whether these properties can carry over to those in the dynamic setting. We see that
the answer depends on whether it favors existing tenants or newcomers.
4.3 Strategy-proofness
An SD spot rule consists of strategy-proof period rules. Also, it ignores the past assignment in
each period. Thus, we have:
Proposition 3. In the general preference domain, any SD spot rule is incentive compatible.21
21In an incentive-compatible SD spot rule without property rights transfer, a proﬁle of true period preferences is
a subgame perfect equilibrium: To see this, note that by deﬁnition, a proﬁle of true period preferences is a Nash
equilibrium. Also, since a spot rule has no property rights transfer, each history starts an SD spot rule for a new
dynamic problem without endowments which is isormorphic to the original. This induced SD spot rule is incentive
compatible, so a proﬁle of true period preferences restricted to the game tree at the history is a Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. (Sketch) The logic is useful in understanding another spot rule in the next section. The
point is that in any period an agent cannot aﬀect the assignments of others with a higher order
than her by lying.22
Consider any newcomer. When it is her turn to choose in the algorithm, all agents with a higher
order than she are already assigned houses. Thus, her lying cannot inﬂuence the assignments of
higer-order agents and get her a preferred house. On the other hand, consider any existing tenant.
Since the past assignment is irrelevant to the current period rule, we can use the same logic to say
that she cannot get a preferred house. By time-separability of preferences, she ﬁnds the assignment
under true period-preferences at least as desirable as the one under false period-preferences.
4.4 Dynamic Pareto eﬃciency and acceptability
It is straightforward to obtain the following by generalizing the example in the Introduction to the
case where there are at least two newcomers.
Theorem 2. Even in the time-invariant preference domain, an SD spot rule favoring newcomers
is not dynamically Pareto eﬃcient.
As in the example of the Introduction, in some preference proﬁle, an SD spot rule favoring new-
comers induces a plan that is dynamically Pareto dominated by the one from an inﬁnite exchange
between newcomers and existing tenants. In this case, there is a conﬂict among agents from diﬀer-
ent cohorts.23 As we saw in the impossibility result, another type of exchange−a ﬁnite exchange
among those in the same cohort−can be a source of dynamic Pareto ineﬃciency. However, when
an SD spot rule favors existing tenants and is constant, such possibilities are also excluded:
Theorem 3. In the general preference domain, a constant SD spot rule favoring existing tenants
is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient.
The proof is in the Appendix. Here is the intuition: By Observation 1, we can have the ordering
F of all agents such that we can reproduce each period t ordering by restricting F to A(t). Thus,
the ﬁrst agent in F is always the ﬁrst in period orderings. Thus, she is assigned her most preferred
house according to her period preference in each period. Hence, she cannot be better oﬀ. The
second agent in F is the second in period orderings unless the ﬁrst agent leaves. If the ﬁrst agent
leaves, the second agent becomes the ﬁrst in period orderings. Thus, the second agent is assigned
her most preferred among the houses except the ﬁrst agent's assigned house in each period. Hence,
the second agent cannot be better oﬀ without hurting the ﬁrst agent in F . Repeating this argument
gives the desired result.
22This logic would fail if incentive compatibility were deﬁned as a dominant strategy of truth-telling for each
agent.
23We discuss a preference domain in the Conclusion where there is no such conﬂict. In this case, an SD spot rule
favoring newcomers is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient.
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Note that dynamic Pareto eﬃciency is achieved by the spot rule that extracts only period
preferences, not the full preferences. Moreover, this spot rule becomes more desirable when agents
have time-invariant preferences, as the following indicates.
Proposition 4. In the general preference domain, when at least two agents arrive in each period,
a constant SD spot rule favoring existing tenants is not acceptable. However, in the time-invariant
preference domain, it is acceptable.
Proof. By Theorem 3, such a spot rule is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient. By the impossibility result,
it is not acceptable. The proof of the second part is obvious.
Remark 1. In the time-invariant preference domain, by Theorem 3 and Proposition 4, we avoid
the impossibility result, i.e., a constant SD spot rule favoring existing tenants is dynamically Pareto
eﬃcient and acceptable.
5 Top Trading Cycles (TTC) Spot Rules
In apartment assignments for an apartment management company, tenants cannot be evicted from
the currently rented apartment. This constrains a spot rule to be acceptable. Moreover, accept-
ability is desirable to both students and universities for on-campus housing. In this section, we
investigate an acceptable spot rule.
We consider a speciﬁc spot rule with property rights transfer, called a TTC spot rule, whose
underlying static rule is Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez's top trading cycles (AS-TTC). For simplicity,
we always consider the rule for a dynamic problem with endowments so that all existing tenants
have property rights on houses.
5.1 Deﬁnitions
In period t ≥ 1, agents in A(t) ≡ E(t) ∪ N(t) are present and houses in H are available. Each
agent a has a period preference Ra(t) on H. Each existing tenant in E(t) has the property rights
on the house she lived in the previous period, while newcomers in N(t) do not. That is, it is a
house allocation problem with existing tenants (E(t), N(t), e(t)|E(t), R(t), H) where each existing
tenant a has the property right on house ea(t) (Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez, 1999). To simplify
the expression, when agent a has the property rights on house h, we say that a owns or occupies
h, and a is the owner of h.
A period t matching µ(t) is individually rational at R(t) if for each existing tenant a ∈ E(t),
µa(t) Ra(t) ea(t), that is, she is assigned a house at least as desirable as her owned house.
Given an endowment proﬁle e(t)|E(t), a period t static rule assigns a period t matching for
each period-preference proﬁle. A period t rule is individually rational if it always selects an
individually rational period t matching for each problem.
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Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez (1999) propose a rule referred to as Abdulkadiro§lu and Sön-
mez's top trading cycles (AS-TTC) period t rule: Let fA(t) be a period t ordering, R(t) ∈
R(t), and an endowment proﬁle, e(t)|E(t). The rule selects a period tmatching through the following
AS-TTC algorithm:
• Assign the ﬁrst agent her top choice, the second agent her top choice among the remaining
houses, and so on, until someone requests the house of an existing tenant.
• If at that point the existing tenant whose house is requested is already assigned another
house, then do not disturb the procedure. Otherwise modify the remainder of the ordering
by inserting the existing tenant before the requester at the ordering of agents and proceed
with the ﬁrst step of procedure through this existing tenant.
• Similarly, insert any existing tenant who has not already been served just before the requestor
in the ordering of agents once her house is requested by an agent.
• If at any point a cycle forms, it is formed by exclusively existing tenants and each of them
requests the house of the existing tenant who is next in the cycle. (A cycle is an ordered list
of agents, (a1, a2, · · · , ak), where agent a1 demands the house of agent a2, agent a2 demands
the house of agent a3, · · · , agent ak demands the house of a1.) In such cases, remove all
agents in the cycle by assigning them the houses they demand and proceed similarly.
Example 1 (The execution of AS-TTC algorithm). This example will be used in the proof
of Theorem 6. We consider period t = 2. Let E(2) = {a11, a12}, N(2) = {a21, a22}, and H =
{h1, h2, h3, h4}. Suppose a11 owns h3 and a12 owns h2. Let R(2) ∈ R(2) be given as:
a11 a
1
2 a
2
1 a
2
2
h1 h1 h2 h4
h3 h2
h2 h3
Let fA(2) = (a21, a
2
2, a
1
1, a
1
2) be the period 2 ordering that favors newcomers. The following four
ﬁgures illustrates the execution of AS-TTC algorithm that proceeds from left to right. In each of
the ﬁgures, the orderings of remaining agents are from left to right, and the owned houses h2 and
h3 point to their owners a12 and a
1
1 as long as the owners are not removed, while available houses
do not point to any agent.
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In the ﬁrst graph, the ﬁrst agent is a21, who requests h2 of existing tenant a
1
2. Because existing
tenant a12 is not assigned a house, modify the ordering by inserting existing tenant a
1
2 before the
requester a21, as indicated by the blue arrow; in the second graph, the ﬁrst agent is a
1
2, who requests
vacant house h1. Thus, assign agent a12 house h1. Then, the second agent is a
2
1, who requests h2
of existing tenant a12. This time, since a
1
2 is already assigned, assign agent a
2
1 her requesting house
h2. Remove the matched agents and houses; in the third graph, the ﬁrst agent is a22, who requests
vacant house h4. Assign agent a22 her requesting house h4; in the last graph, the ﬁrst agent is a
1
1,
who requests house h3 owned by herself. This forms a trivial cycle consisting only of a11. Assign
agent a11 her owned house h3. There are no agents left, and so the procedure stops. As a result,
µ(a11,a12,a21,a22)(2) = (h3, h1, h2, h4). ♦
Note that any AS-TTC static rule is individually rational. This is because a house owned by an
existing tenant is not assigned to another agent before this existing tenant is assigned a house. If
another agent demands the house of this existing tenant, she is promoted to the top of the ordering.
At the top of the ordering, if there is no house available better than her owned house, then the
existing tenant demands her own house. At this point, a trivial cycle consisting of this agent forms.
Then, she leaves and is assigned at worst her owned house.
Theorem 4 (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1999). For any period ordering, fA(t), the induced AS-
TTC static rule is individually rational, statically Pareto eﬃcient, and strategy-proof.
A top trading cycles (TTC) spot rule induced by a sequence of period orderings
{fA(t)}∞t=1 is a spot rule with property rights transfer in which each period t, the period t rule is
the AS-TTC static rule induced by period t ordering fA(t). In the same way as SD spot rules, we
can deﬁne a TTC spot rule favoring existing tenants (newcomers), a constant TTC spot
rule, and a TTC spot rule.
Since an AS-TTC static rule is individually rational, any TTC spot rule is acceptable. There-
fore, from the impossibility result, in the general preference domain, any TTC spot rule is not
dynamically Pareto eﬃcient. We focus on the time-invariant preference domain, because this do-
main avoids the impossibility result (Remark 2) and has diﬀerent implications from those of static
models.
5.2 Strategy-proofness: some positive results
Recall that because it ignores the past assignment in each period, an SD spot rule is incentive
compatible (Proposition 3). By contrast, a TTC spot rule guarantees each agent a house that is at
least as desirable as the previously assigned house. This opens up the possibility of manipulation
in which an agent obtains a worse house by lying, expecting to be upgraded in the ordering by
being requested by some other agent in the next period. But a speciﬁc seniority-based TTC spot
rule excludes such a possibility:
16
Theorem 5. In the time-invariant preference domain, a constant TTC spot rule favoring existing
tenants is incentive compatible.24
To prove the theorem, we introduce the notion of eﬀective period ordering introduced by Sönmez
and Ünver (2005). For each ordering fA(t), the AS-TTC algorithm assigns houses in one of two
possible ways:
1. There is a sub-ordering (a1, · · · , ak) of agents where a1 demands the house of a2, a2 demands
the house of a3, · · · , agent ak−1 demands house of ak, and ak demands any available house.
We call such a sub-ordering a serial-ordering (S).
2. There is a sub-ordering (a1, · · · , ak) of existing tenants where a1 receives ak's house, ak receives
ak−1's house, · · · , a2 receives a1's house. We call such sub-ordering a loop-ordering (L).
For a given ordering, fA(t), we construct the eﬀective period ordering, denoted by gA(t), as
follows: Apply the AS-TTC algorithm and order agents according to how their assignments are
ﬁnalized. When there is a loop-ordering, order these agents as in the loop-ordering.
Note that a period matching induced by an AS-TTC algorithm yields the same one induced
by an SD period rule with this eﬀective ordering. Also note that the eﬀective period ordering is
endogenous, depending on preferences and the exogenous period ordering.
We now examine how eﬀective period orderings behave under a constant sequence of period
orderings favoring existing tenants. LetR ∈ R and {fA(t)}∞t=1 be such a sequence of period orderings.
By Observation 1, let F := (fE(1), fN(1), fN(2), · · · ) be the ordering of all agents consisting of cohort
orderings with F |A(t) = fA(t). For expositional simplicity, we use
fN(t) := (a
t
1, a
t
2, · · · , atn)
for each t ≥ 1. Observe that in period 1,
gA(1) =
 E(1)︷ ︸︸ ︷X, · · · , X︸ ︷︷ ︸
initial existing tenants
,
N(1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
S︸︷︷︸
a11
, S︸︷︷︸
a12
, · · · , S︸︷︷︸
a1n
 =
 E(1)︷ ︸︸ ︷X, · · · , X, fN(1)
 ,
where X is either S or L. Recall that S stands for a serial-ordering and L for a loop-ordering.
That is, since newcomers do not own a house and the ordering fA(1) favors existing tenants, initial
existing tenants are higher up than newcomers in the ordering. Moreover, because each newcomer
owns no house, she demands an available house and forms a serial-ordering consisting of herself.
24In an incentive-compatible TTC spot rule with property rights transfer, a proﬁle of true period preferences is
a subgame perfect equilibrium: To see this, note that by deﬁnition, a proﬁle of true period preferences is a Nash
equilibrium. Also, since a spot rule has property rights transfer, each history starts a TTC spot rule for a new
dynamic problem with endowments where the initial existing tenants are the existing tenants and the endowments
are the houses on which the existing tenants have property rights, which is isormorphic to the original. This induced
TTC spot rule is incentive compatible, so a proﬁle of true period preferences restricted to the game tree at the history
is a Nash equilibrium.
17
Now, consider period 2. Note that existing tenants in period 2 are also newcomers in period 1
and the houses of existing tenants in period 1 become vacant in period 2. The ﬁrst agent in fA(2)
is a11. In period 1, she prefers her assignment to those assigned to the other newcomers. Thus,
since her assignment in period 1 becomes her endowment in period 2, she never demands the house
owned by agent a1i , i ≥ 2, but demands her own or an available house. Repeat this argument until
there is no existing agent left. Then, the ﬁrst agent among newcomers is a21. Since all existing
tenants left the market in the algorithm, all remaining houses are not owned by any agent. Thus,
she demands an available house. Repeating this argument for all of the other newcomers, we obtain
gA(2) =
 E(2)=N(1)︷ ︸︸ ︷X︸︷︷︸
a11
, · · · , X︸︷︷︸
a1n
,
N(2)︷ ︸︸ ︷
S︸︷︷︸
a21
, · · · , S︸︷︷︸
a2n
 = (fN(1), fN(2)).
Repeating this process, in period t ≥ 3, we obtain
gA(t) =
 E(t)=N(t−1)︷ ︸︸ ︷X︸︷︷︸
at−11
, · · · , X︸︷︷︸
at−1n
,
N(t)︷ ︸︸ ︷
S︸︷︷︸
at1
, · · · , S︸︷︷︸
atn
 = (fN(t−1), fN(t)).
Notice the dynamics of the TTC spot rule: exchanges involve only one agent as in a serial or
loop ordering after the initial existing tenants leave.
Proof. (Sketch) Observe that a sequence of eﬀective period orderings is constant among all agents
who are not initial existing tenants. Also, a plan induced by the TTC spot rule coincides with the
SD spot rule induced by a sequence of eﬀective orderings. By these observations, the logic of the
proof is similar to that in Proposition 3 for an SD spot rule.
Consider any initial existing tenant. She lives there only in period 1. Thus, she faces the
strategy-proof AS-TTC period rule. Thus, truth-telling is a dominant strategy for her.
Consider any newcomer in period t ≥ 1. In each period when she is present, by the construction
of eﬀective period orderings, we conclude that her lying does not inﬂuence the eﬀective period
orderings of the higher-order agents. Thus, her lying does not change the assignment of these
agents. Thus, when it is her turn to demand a house in the algorithm, the houses available given
her truth-telling and lying are the same. So truth-telling gets her a house at least as desirable as
the one under lying. By time-separability of preferences, her assignment under truth-telling is at
least as desirable as the one under lying.
5.3 How can a TTC spot rule be manipulated?
Theorem 6. Consider the time-invariant preference domain. Suppose that at least two agents
arrive in each period. Then, a TTC spot rule favoring newcomers is not incentive compatible.
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Proof. Suppose that agents at1 and a
t
2 arrive in each period t ≥ 1, and there are initial existing
tenants a01 and a
0
2. Fix a sequence of period orderings that favors newcomers. Without loss of
generality, at1 has a higher order than a
t
2 in each period t. Note that this sequence may not be
constant, i.e., at2 may have a higher order than a
t
1 in the period t+ 1 ordering. Let R ∈ R be such
that true period preferences satisfy the left table (from best to worst):
a01 a
0
2 a
1
1 a
1
2 a
2
1 a
2
2
h1 h4 h1 h1 h2 h4
h3 h2
h2 h3
a11
h1
h2
h3
where the underlined houses are the endowment of the initial existing tenants. Moreover, agent
a11's preference satisﬁes
(h2, h1) Pa11 (h3, h3).
We see that agent a11 has an incentive to lie by reporting the period preference in the right
table in periods 1 and 2: Looking at Figure 1, in period 1, when it is a11's turn to choose, h2 and
h3 are available. Truth-telling gives her h3 and lying gives her h2. Looking at Figure 2, under
truth-telling, h1 is assigned to a12. Under lying, a
1
1 successfully gets her top choice h1. Overall,
a11 is assigned (h3, h3) under truth-telling and is assigned (h2, h1) under lying. Hence, she has an
incentive to lie.
Figure 1: AS-TTC algorithms up to agent a11's turn in period t = 1 under the truthful preference
(left) and the manipulated preference (right) in Theorem 6.
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Figure 2: AS-TTC algorithms until h1 is assigned in period t = 2 under the truthful preference
(left) and the manipulated preference (right). Here a11 is the ﬁrst and a
1
2 is the second, but the
reverse ordering gives the same period matching in Theorem 6.
5.4 Dynamic Pareto eﬃciency: some positive results
Using the analysis of eﬀective period orderings for a constant TTC spot rule favoring existing
tenants, we obtain the following positive result.
Theorem 7. In the time-invariant preference domain, a constant TTC spot rule favoring existing
tenants is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient.
Proof. (Sketch) The proof is similar to that in Theorem 3 for the dynamic Pareto eﬃciency of a
constant SD spot rule favoring existing tenants in that the sequence of eﬀective period orderings is
constant among all agents except initial existing tenants, and in each period the period matching
induced by the AS-TTC rule yields the same period matching induced by the SD static rule with
the eﬀective period ordering. Thus, we need to take care of initial existing tenants. They face the
Pareto-eﬃcient AS-TTC period rule in period 1. Hence, they cannot be better oﬀ without hurting
others.
Remark 2. Any TTC spot rule is acceptable. Thus, in the time-invariant preference domain,
by Theorem 7, we avoid the impossibility result, i.e., a constant TTC spot rule favoring existing
tenants is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient and acceptable.
5.5 When is a TTC spot rule undesirable?
The example in the Introduction shows the dynamic Pareto ineﬃciency of an SD spot rule favor-
ing newcomers. There, we demonstrate that an inﬁnite exchange between existing tenants and
newcomers dynamically Pareto dominates the plan induced by the SD spot rule favoring newcom-
ers. Looking at this example more closely, we might think that acceptability precludes such an
exchange. Since a TTC spot rule is acceptable, one might conjecture that a TTC spot rule favoring
newcomers is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient. However, this is not the case:
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Theorem 8. Consider the time-invariant preference domain. Suppose that at least two agents ar-
rive in each period. Then, a TTC spot rule favoring newcomers is not dynamically Pareto eﬃcient.
Proof. Suppose that agents at1 and a
t
2 arrive in each period t, and there are initial existing tenants
a01 and a
0
2. Fix a sequence of period orderings that favors newcomers. Without loss of generality,
we may assume at1 is the ﬁrst agent in each period t ordering, and a
0
1 has a higher order than a
0
2.
Note that this sequence may not be constant; at2 may have a higher order than a
t
1 in the period
t + 1 ordering. But this does not aﬀect the induced plan in the example below. Let preferences
satisfy
a01 a
0
2 a
1
1 a
1
2 a
2
1 a
2
2 a
3
1 a
3
2 a
4
1 a
4
2
h3 h4 h4 h4 h3 h3 h1 h1 h2 h2
h1 h2 h2 h4 h3 h1
h1 h2 h4 h3
h3 h1 h2 h4
a12 a
2
2 a
3
2 a
4
2
(h3, h2) (h1, h4) (h2, h3) (h4, h1)
(h1, h1) (h2, h2) (h4, h4) (h3, h3)
The left table shows period preferences. The right table shows entire preferences. The houses
owned by initial existing tenants are underlined in the left table. Each of the other agents has the
following preferences: for each t ≥ 1 and each i = 1, 2,
• Agent a4t+1i has the same preference as a1i does,
• Agent a4t+2i has the same preference as a2i does,
• Agent a4t+3i has the same preference as a3i does, and
• Agent a4t+4i has the same preference as a4i does.
The TTC spot rule induces the plan µ in Table 2. Clearly, µ is not dynamically Pareto eﬃcient.
Notice that starting with µ, an inﬁnite exchange of houses between agents at−12 and a
t
2 in each
period t (t ≥ 2), dynamically Pareto dominates µ.
6 An Extension
We study the general case where agents live for at least three periods. In this case, we show
in Proposition 5 that a constant TTC spot rule favoring existing tenants is no longer incentive
compatible nor dynamically Pareto eﬃcient. The reason is that some of the initial existing tenants,
who have property rights on houses in period 1, live for multiple periods. By contrast, any positive
results of SD spot rules still hold, because initial existing tenants do not have property rights.
To highlight the above issue without notational complexity, we focus on three periods during
which agents live. The case for any other span of periods can be extended in a straightforward way.
The model starts at t = 1. In each period t ≥ 1, n agents arrive to live for three periods and
then leave (Table 6). In period 1, there are two types of initial existing tenants: those who
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Table 2: In each cell, houses on the left side are the plan µ induced by the TTC spot rule, while
houses with parentheses on the right are given by another plan in Theorem 8.
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 6 · · ·
a01 h3
a02 h2
a11 h4 h4
a12 h1 h1(h2)
a21 h3 h3
a22 h2(h1) h2(h4)
a31 h1 h1
a32 h4(h2) h4(h3)
a41 h2 h2
a42 h3(h4) h3(h1)
a51 h4 h4
a52 h1(h3) h1(h2)
...
...
. . .
live in period 1, denoted by a−1i , i = 1, · · · , n; and those who live in periods 1 and 2, denoted by
a−1i , i = 1, · · · , n. With a slight abuse of notation and for simplicity, we imagine that agent a−1i
has arrived in period −1 that is two periods before the model starts, and also a0i has arrived in
period 0. For t ≥ −1, let N(t) = {at1, · · · , atn} be the set of agents who arrive in period t. In each
period t ≥ 1, agents are from three diﬀerent cohorts of N(t − 2), N(t − 1), and N(t). Agents in
E(t) := N(t−2)∪N(t−1) are called existing tenants in period t, while agents in N(t) are called
newcomers in period t. Let A(t) := E(t)∪N(t) be the set of all agents present in period t. Also,
let A := ∪t≥1A(t) be the set of all agents. Preferences are deﬁned in a similar way as in Section 2.
In a dynamic problem without endowments, no initial existing tenants have property rights.
In a dynamic problem with endowments, all initial existing tenants in E(1) have property
rights on houses for period 1.
It is straightforward to extend all deﬁnitions and propositions of spot rules in Section 3, all
deﬁnitions of period orderings and SD spot rules in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, all results of SD spot rules
in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, and all deﬁnitions of TTC spot rules in Section 5.1. However, we cannot
directly extend the results of TTC spot rules in Section 5, as the following shows.
Proposition 5. Consider the time-invariant preference domain. Suppose that agents live for three
periods. Then, a constant TTC spot rule favoring existing tenants can be manipulated by an initial
existing tenant if at least three newcomers arrive in each period, and is not dynamically Pareto
eﬃcient if at least two newcomers arrive in each period.
The proof is in the Appendix. The reason is that some of the initial existing tenants stay in
the market for multiple periods. This can be seen by looking at the behavior of the eﬀective period
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Table 3: Demographic structure when the life span is three: The table shows when an agent is
present. For example, agent ati is present in periods t, t+ 1, and t+ 2.
1 2 3 · · · t t+ 1 t+ 2 · · ·
a−1i −
a0i − −
a1i − − −
...
at−2i −
at−1i − −
ati − − −
orderings. By the logic used in Section 5.2, we can obtain the following eﬀective period orderings:
gA(t) =

( E(1)≡N(−1)∪N(0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
X, · · · , X , fN(1)
)
if t = 1,( E(1)∩A(2)=N(0)︷ ︸︸ ︷
X, · · · , X , fN(1), fN(2)
)
if t = 2,(
fN(t−2), fN(t−1), fN(t)
)
if t ≥ 3.
where X is a serial-ordering or a loop-ordering. Observe that the above sequence of eﬀective period
orderings is constant among all agents except initial existing tenants. Thus, we weaken incentive
compatibility and dynamic Pareto eﬃciency by focusing on all agents except initial existing tenants.
Deﬁnition 4. 1. A spot rule is incentive compatible among all agents except initial
existing tenants25 if we drop condition (1) in Deﬁnition 2, i.e., the truthful revelation of
period orderings is the best strategy for each agent who is not an initial existing tenant, given
that all of the other agents reveal truthful period preferences.
(a) A plan ν dynamically Pareto dominates another plan µ among all agents except
initial existing tenants at a preference proﬁle R if
i. for each t ≥ 1, {µa(t) : a ∈ A \ E(1)} = {νa(t) : a ∈ A \ E(1)}, and
ii. for each a ∈ A \ E(1), ν Ra µ and for some a ∈ A \ E(1), ν Pa µ.
(b) A plan is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient among all agents except initial existing
tenants at a preference proﬁle R if it is not dynamically Pareto dominated by any other
plan among all agents except initial existing tenants at R.
(c) A spot rule is dynamically Pareto eﬃcient among all agents except initial ex-
isting tenants if, for each preference proﬁle, it always selects a plan that is dynamically
Pareto eﬃcient among all agents except initial existing tenants at this preference proﬁle.
25Note that if a spot rule is incentive compatible among all agents except initial existing tenants, then truth-telling
is a dominant strategy among history-independent strategies for each agent who is not an initial existing tenant.
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Then, we can restore the positive results while retaining the negative results:
Proposition 6. In the time-invariant preference domain, when agents live for three periods,
1. a constant TTC spot rule favoring existing tenants is incentive compatible and dynamically
Pareto eﬃcient among all agents except initial existing tenants, and
2. if at least two newcomers arrive in each period, then a TTC spot rule favoring newcomers is
neither incentive compatible nor dynamically Pareto eﬃcient among all agents except initial
existing tenants.
Proof. For the ﬁrst part, because the sequence of eﬀective period ordering is constant among all
agents except initial existing tenants, we can use the same logic employed in Theorems 5 and 7.
For the second part, it is straightforward to generalize the examples in Theorems 6 and 8.
A constant TTC spot rule favoring existing tenants does not perform well when initial existing
tenants are present, but it does perform well after they leave. This shows that in terms of market
design, it is important to consider how to treat initial existing tenants and their property rights. It
might be possible to invalidate the property rights of initial existing tenants to obtain full dynamic
Pareto eﬃciency and incentive compatibility. If not, such a possibility is excluded but the TTC
spot rule still performs well in the long run after initial existing tenants leave.
7 Conclusion
Real-life examples use the priority ordering of agents to allocate indivisible objects to agents. The
ordering often favors seniors. As long as we stick to the static models, our explanation for this
would be that seniors demand respect. However, turning to the dynamic structure inherent in
real-life markets, this paper uncovers an important advantage of using seniority-based assignment
orderings in terms of positive properties such as Pareto eﬃciency and incentive compatibility.
Although we have examined two preference domains, we can apply the rationale and the tools
developed in this paper to the other kinds of domains. For example, suppose agents' preferences are
known to evolve in a speciﬁc pattern: Suppose the number of houses is equally divided between quiet
and noisy houses. Also, suppose agents live for two periods. Newcomers prefer noisy houses to quiet
ones; existing tenants prefer the quiet to the noisy. Agents have heterogeneous period preferences for
the same type of houses. Note that there is no conﬂict among diﬀerent cohorts, that is, newcomers
prefer noisy houses and existing tenants prefer quiet ones. Thus, if we apply a statically Pareto-
eﬃcient rule as in a spot rule of SD and TTC, then newcomers are assigned the noisy and existing
tenants are the quiet. Thus, each period rule is not aﬀected by the previous assignment. Hence, an
SD spot rule is acceptable and dynamically Pareto eﬃcient as well as incentive compatible. Also, a
TTC spot rule is incentive compatible and dynamically Pareto eﬃcient as well as acceptable.
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The research into dynamic house allocation problems has started only recently. This paper
oﬀers a new perspective on the performance of seniority-based static rules. Our results raise several
interesting questions about market design: Comparing the results of the two spot rules, we notice
that an SD spot rule is robust to the dynamic structure, but a TTC spot rule is vulnerable to
it. However, the property of acceptability, which is desirable and sometimes necessary in real-
life markets, is not generally satisﬁed in an SD spot rule unlike a TTC spot rule. This might
beg the question as to why AS-TTC rules have never been used, although the RSD rule with
squatting rights is widely used despite the lack of some desirable static properties. Our model
is limited and abstracts from many realistic situations in order to highlight the importance of
seniority-based rules. Thus, it would be interesting to see how a TTC spot rule behaves under
more realistic assumptions on the evolution of preferences based on experiences, the entry and
exit of agents, and the introduction of an outside option. Finally, it would be interesting to study
lottery rules in addition to the deterministic rules studied in this paper. These issues remain for
future investigation.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that two agents arrive in each period, and live for two periods.
Then, let H := {h1, · · · , h4}. Seeking a contradiction, suppose that there is such a spot rule Π.
Pick two newcomers a11 and a
1
2 in period 1. Let R ∈ R such that
a11 a
1
2
Ra(1) Ra(2) Ra(1) Ra(2)
h1 h2 h1 h2
h2 h1 h2 h1
a11 a
1
2
Ra Ra
(h1, h1) (h2, h2)
(h2, h2) (h1, h1)
Also, for each a ∈ A \ {a11, a12}, each τ ∈ N when a is present in τ , and each h ∈ H \ {h1, h2},
h Ra(τ) h1 and h Ra(τ) h2.
Let µ := Π[p(R)]. Since µ ∈ PD(R), then for each τ = 1, 2, µ(τ) ∈ P τS(R(τ)). Thus, for each
τ = 1, 2, either µa11,a12(τ) = (h2, h1) or µa11,a12(τ) = (h1, h2).
Case 1: µa11,a12(1) = (h2, h1). By acceptability, µa11(2) = h2. Thus, µa12(2) = h1. Thus, µa11 = (h2, h2)
and µa12 = (h1, h1). Let ν ∈M such that νa11 = (h1, h1), νa12 = (h2, h2), and for each a ∈ A\{a11, a12},
νa = µa. Then, ν dynamically Pareto dominates µ at R. This contradicts µ ∈ PD(R).
Case 2: µa11,a12(τ) = (h1, h2). By the same reasoning as in Case 1, µa11 = (h1, h1) and µa12 = (h2, h2).
Now, let R′ ∈ R \ {R} be such that for each a ∈ A and each t ∈ N, R′a(t) = Ra(t), and
Ra11 Ra12
(h2, h2) (h1, h1)
(h1, h1) (h2, h2)
Then, Π[p(R′)] = µ. Let ν ∈ M such that νa11 = (h2, h2), νa12 = (h1, h1), and for each a ∈
A\{a11, a12}, νa = µa. Then, ν dynamically Pareto dominates µ at R′. This contradicts µ ∈ PD(R′).
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Proof of Theorem 3. Let R ∈ R. Let f = {fA(t)}∞t=1 be a constant sequence of period orderings
that favors existing tenants. Let µ = SDf (p(R)). To ﬁnd a contradiction, suppose that some plan
ν dynamically Pareto dominates µ at R, i.e.,
for each a ∈ A, ν Ra µ, and for some b ∈ A, ν Pb µ. (1)
From Observation 1, there is an ordering of all agents, F = (fE(1), fN(1), fN(2) · · · ) with F |A(t) =
fA(t). For convenience, suppose F = (a1, a2, · · · , am, · · · ). We show by induction on m that for
each m = 1, 2, · · · , µam = νam , i.e., ν = µ, which contradicts (1).
Induction basis: m = 1. Since f favors existing tenants, a1 is an initial existing tenant. Since
F |A(1) = fA(1), she is the ﬁrst agent in fA(1). Thus, she is assigned her most preferred house in H
according to Ra1 ≡ Ra1(1). Thus, µa1 Ra1 νa1 . By (1) and the strict preference of Ra1(1), we have
µa1 = νa1 .
Induction step: Suppose that the claim is true up to m− 1, i.e., µa1 = νa1 , · · · , µam−1 = νam−1 .
First, we show that
for each t ∈ Nsuch that amis present in period t, µam(t) Ram(t) νam(t). (2)
Let t ∈ N be such that agent am is present in period t. Since F |A(t) = fA(t), then each agent
a ∈ A with a higher order than am in fA(t) is one of agents a1, · · · , am−1. Thus, by the induction
hypothesis, µa(t) = νa(t). Thus, when it is am's turn to choose, the remaining houses are in
H \ {µa(t)|a = a1, · · · , am−1} = H \ {νa(t)|a = a1, · · · , am−1}. Since µam(t) is am's most preferred
house among the remaining houses, µam(t) Ram(t) νam(t). Thus, (2) is true.
If am is an initial existing tenant, since Ram = Ram(1) is a strict preference, by (1) and (2),
µam = νam . Suppose am is a newcomer in period t. Then, by (2) and the ﬁrst condition of time-
separability of preferences, µam Ram νam . Thus, by (1), νam Ram µam . Thus, from the second
condition of time-separability, either [for some τ = t, t + 1, νam(τ) Pam(τ) µam(τ)] or [for each
τ = t, t + 1, νam(τ) Ram(τ) µam(τ)]. The former is impossible. Thus, for each τ = t, t + 1,
νam(τ) Iam(τ) µam(τ) where Iam(τ) is the indiﬀerence relation of Ram(τ). Because the period
preference is strict, for each τ = t, t+ 1, νam(τ) = µam(τ). That is, νam = µam .
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that agents live for three periods.
For the ﬁrst part, suppose that three agents arrive in each period. We focus on initial existing
tenants in E(1) = {a−11 , a−12 , a−13 , a01, a02, a03}. Since there are six initial existing tenants, we explicitly
consider six houses, h1 through h6. Period preferences of each initial existing tenant satisfy the left
table below:
a−11 a
−1
2 a
−1
3 a
0
1 a
0
2 a
0
3
h1 h5 h3 h6 h1 h1
h4 h2 h2
h6
a02
h1
h6
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In addition, agent a02 prefers (h6, h1) to (h2, h2). Endowments are indicated within the paren-
theses in the ﬁrst column in the tables below. Let {fA(t)}∞t=1 be a constant sequence of period
orderings with fA(1)|E(1) := (a−11 , a−12 , a−13 , a01, a02, a03) and fA(2)|E(1) := (a01, a02, a03).
t = 1 t = 2 · · ·
a−11 (h1) h1
a−12 (h2) h5
a−13 (h3) h3
a01 (h4) h4 h6
a02 (h5) h2 h2
a03 (h6) h6 h1
t = 1 t = 2 · · ·
a−11 (h1) h1
a−12 (h2) h5
a−13 (h3) h3
a01 (h4) h4 h6
a02 (h5) h6 h1
a03 (h6) h2 h2
The left table shows a plan selected by the TTC spot rule when agent a02 reveals her true
period preference, while the right table shows a plan selected by the TTC spot rule when a02 lies
by reporting the period preference in period 1 and 2 as in the right table above. This shows that
a02 manipulates the rule.
For the second part, suppose that two agents arrive in each period. We focus on initial existing
tenants in E(1) = {a−11 , a−12 , a01, a02}. Since there are four initial existing tenants, we explicitly
consider four houses h1 through h4. Suppose all agents a except a
−1
2 have an identical preference
such that Pa(t) : h1, h2, h3,, and a
−1
2 's top choice is h4. In addition, (h2, h2) Pa01 (h3, h1) and
(h3, h1) Pa02 (h2, h2). Endowments are indicated in the ﬁrst column on the table below. Period
orderings satisfy fA(t) = (a
t−2
1 , a
t−2
2 , a
t−1
1 , a
t−1
2 , a
t
1, a
t
2) for each t ≥ 1. The TTC spot rule produces
the following plan:
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 · · ·
a−11 (h1) h1
a−12 (h2) h4
a01 (h3) h3 (h2) h1 (h2)
a02 (h4) h2 (h3) h2 (h1)
Consider another plan in which a01 exchange (h3, h1) for (h2, h2) with a
0
2. This plan dynamically
Pareto dominates the one induced by the TTC spot rule. This shows that the TTC spot rule is
not dynamically Pareto eﬃcient.
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